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POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE CURED THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT. 
Defendant claims, and plaintiffs acknowledge, that the 
judgment appealed from was not final under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
Plaintiffs' counsel discovered this problem while preparing 
plaintiffs' initial brief, and disclosed that Pro-Benefit Staffing, 
Inc., had been made a party to the action and was served by 
publication, and the case against Pro-Benefit remained pending at 
the time the notice of appeal was filed. 
At a hearing before the district court on August 2, 1993, the 
court awarded a default judgment against Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. 
The formal judgment will be entered and filed with this Court in a 
matter of days. Upon entry of that judgment against Pro-Benefit, 
the judgment against Intercare Benefit Systems becomes final, thus 
curing the jurisdictional defect. 
Defendant asserts the only proper remedy is to dismiss the 
appeal without prejudice. Plaintiffs request that this Court 
reject the prior Utah decisions that would require such a result, 
in favor of the approach adopted by the majority of the federal 
courts. Before 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, like the Utah state courts, held that if an appeal 
was mistakenly taken from a non-final judgment but the lack of 
finality was cured during the appeal, dismissal was still required. 
Then the en banc court reversed its prior position in favor of 
saving time and resources by allowing a jurisdictional defect to be 
cured. Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Citing to cases from the D.C., 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th circuits, the 
court noted: 
Apparently all of the other circuits that have 
considered this matter, however, have accepted 
jurisdiction in analogous circumstances, 
notwithstanding a premature filing of a notice 
of appeal. These circuits hold pre-Rule 54(b) 
appeals in abeyance while the parties obtain 
certification after the court's reminder of 
the omission, treating the 54(b) certification 
as relating nunc pro tunc to the date of the 
notice of appeal or treating the notice of 
appeal as ripening as of the date of the 54 (b) 
certification. 
850 F.2d at 643 (citations omitted). 
Additional federal circuits have now adopted the same rule. 
Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel Stores, Inc.. 924 F.2d 530 (4th 
Cir. 1991); In re Chateaucray Corp. , 922 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Martinez v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., 865 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1988). 
The Kansas Supreme Court has also followed suit. Honeycutt v. City 
of Wichita. 251 Kan. 451, 836 P.2d 1128, 1136 (1992). 
2 
A copy of the Lewis decision is attached for the Court's 
reference. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS 
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
Before the trial court both parties and the court were 
laboring under the mistaken understanding that if ERISA preemption 
applied, the state court lacked jurisdiction. For example, 
defendants counsel argued: 
And if a claim relates to an employee benefit 
plan, regardless of who asserts it, that claim 
is preempted, and common-law causes of action 
must be dismissed and the federal court has 
got jurisdiction over that. 
. . . . 
. . . In any event, the case should be dis-
missed by this Court and Mr. Wolsey can look 
at whatever remedies he has in the federal 
court. 
R. 256-257. 
Although defendant has now correctly explained that the state 
court has concurrent jurisdiction over ERISA claims for denial of 
benefits, that is not the position defendant took below. Had 
plaintiffs been aware that the state court had concurrent jurisdic-
tion, plaintiff would have sought leave to amend to assert the 
ERISA claims in the state court. Where both parties were mistaken 
as to the court7s jurisdiction, it is only fair that plaintiffs be 
granted relief from that mistake. The case should be remanded to 
3 
permit plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to assert 
claims under ERISA. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that because the judgment appealed from 
is now final, the jurisdictional defect has been cured. The Court 
should then remand the case to permit plaintiffs to seek leave to 
amend their complaint to assert claims under ERISA. 
Alternatively, this Court should dismiss the appeal without 
prejudice. 
DATED this ^ ^ ^ day of August, 1993. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
FRED D. HOWARD, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 2nd 
day of August, 1993. 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Strong & Harmi 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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such a process, the standard federal rule is 
and has been that a landowner may testify 
as to the market value of his own property. 
It is only when his own testimony negates 
the presumption that he has special knowl-
edge of his property that a court is autho-
rized to find such testimony alone insuffi-
cient to support a jury verdict in faVor of 
the landowner. Sowards, 370 F.2d at 92. 
Even in such cases the court cannot pre-
vent the owner from testifying as to value, 
although it can prevent the case from go-
ing to the jury. 
Here, Sharp testified that his ranch prop-
erty had unique characteristics which 
where were well-suited to a cow/calf opera-
tion. He also testified that, as compared to 
other ranches, its carrying capacity, when 
combined with this suitability, increased 
the ranch's value. 
The district court, in the first trial prop-
erly permitted Sharp to testify as to the 
value of the ranch. It also properly deter-
mined, after it had allowed Sharp to testify, 
that Sharp's testimony, since it was based 
on unacceptable methods of valuation, was 
insufficient to support a jury verdict In 
the second trial, however, the trial court 
refused to allow Sharp to testify as to the 
value of his property, even though Sharp 
made it clear in his testimony that his 
evaluation was not based on inherently im-
permissible methods. 
It might be argued that the error did not 
affect Sharp's substantial rights if the 
court would have nonetheless determined 
that Sharp's testimony was insufficient evi-
dence on which a jury verdict might have 
rested* But we cannot reach that conclu-
sion here. Unlike his valuation in the first 
trial, Sharp clearly indicated that he based 
his calculation of the value of his property 
on the sales prices of comparative proper-
ties and not their offering price. The sales 
price of "comparable property within a rea-
sonable time before taking" is viewed as 
the best evidence of fair market value in 
this Circuit See Sowards, 370 F.2d at 89; 
United States v. 77,819.10 Acres of Land, 
647 F.2d 104, 109 (10th Cir.1981), cert de-
& Because we find that the district court com-
mitted reversible error in so ruling, we do not 
GOODRICH CO. 6 4 1 
641 (10th Cir. 1988) 
nied, 456 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct 1971, 72 L.EA 
2d 441 (1982). Hence, "[w]e are not pre-
pared to say . . . that the trial court would, 
or could, have concluded that the evidence 
in this case, once recognized as admissible, 
was of insufficient probative force to sus-
tain a jury verdict" LaCombe, 679 F.2d at 
436. Nor can we conclude that the jury 
would have rejected Sharp's testimony as 
not credible. Id. The only other evidence 
offered by Sharp Ranch which was admit-
ted to establish the fair market value of the 
ranch was the lay opinion testimony of 
Gordon Scranton. We cannot say, after 
reviewing the whole trial, that the testimo-
ny of Clifton Sharp would not have influ-
enced the jury's award in this case. Be-
cause a property owner has the right to 
testify as to the value of his property, and 
because Mr. Sharp's rights in this regard 
were denied, we hold that the district court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
Sharp Ranch a new trial* 
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district 
court's decision to grant the first new trial; 
we REVERSE its decision to deny the sec-
ond; and we REMAND for a new trial. 
IKEYNUMKISYSTM 
' ^ > V » * * ^ ^ 3> 
Robert LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
BJ\ GOODRICH COMPANY; Daniel 
Newsome; Roy Ailstock, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 87-1110. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
July 5, 1988. 
Plaintiff sued defendants for their al-
leged slander, and the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of 
consider any other alleged errors raised by 
Sharp Ranch. 
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Oklahoma, Thomas R. Brett, J., entered 
order summarily disposing of less than all 
of claims. Plaintiff appealed. After plain-
tiff had filed notice of appeal, remaining 
claims were subsequently dismissed. The 
Court of Appeals, Logan, Circuit Judge, 
held that premature notice of appeal from 
order disposing of less than all of claims in. 
case is nevertheless effective, where appel-
lant obtains certification or final adjudica-
tion of matter before Court of Appeals 
considers appeal on its merits. 
So ordered. 
Baldock, Circuit Judge, dissented and 
filed opinion, in which Brorby, Circuit 
Judge, joined 
Federal Courts *»668 
Premature notice of appeal from order 
disposing of le&& than all of claims ixv ca&e 
is effective, where appellant obtains a certi-
fication or a final adjudication of matter 
before appeal is considered on its merits; 
overruling Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167 
(10th Cir.); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Sims Con-
solidated, Ltd., 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.); 
Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus-
tries, Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir.). Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 54(b), 28 U.S.CJL; 
F.R.A.P.Rule 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Jim Brent Smalling, Chickasha, OkL, for 
plaintiff-appellant 
C. William Threlkeld of Fenton, Fenton, 
Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City, 
OkL, for defendants-appellees. 
Before HOLLOWAY, McKAY, 
LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, 
ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK and 
BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 
LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 
In this diversity action plaintiff Robert 
Lewis sued defendants B.F. Goodrich Com-
1. Noting that many if not all of the circuit 
courts which have considered the matter have 
disagreed with our result in A.O. Smith, this 
court sua sponte ordered en banc consideration 
of the jurisdictional issue to decide whether we 
should overrule A.O. Smith. After examining 
the briefs and the appellate record, the court 
pany, Daniel Newsome, and Roy Ailstock 
for slander in federal district court The 
district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants by its order of 
December 18, 1986, and plaintiff filed a 
notice of appeal on January 16, 1987, chal-
lenging this judgment Hie issue before 
this en banc court is whether we have 
jurisdiction over the appeal. In deciding 
this issue, we reassess our holding in A.O. 
Smith Corp. v. Sims Consolidated, Ltd, 
647 F.2d 118, 120-21 (10th Cir.1981).1 
The grant of summary judgment here 
was not an appealable final order because a 
counterclaim by B.F. Goodrich against 
Lewis remained unadjudicated when the 
district court entered summary judgment 
Responding to a motion which B.F. Good-
rich had filed after the grant of summary 
judgment in the underlying cause, the dis-
trict cotfft entered an order in \ate Decem-
ber staying proceedings on the counter-
claim. The order was labeled an ''adminis-
trative closing order" and stated: 
'The Defendant B.F. Goodrich having 
requested the Court to stay its Counter-
claim in this cause of action, it is hereby 
ordered that the Clerk administratively 
terminate this action in his records, with-
out prejudice to the rights of the Defend-
ant B<F. Goodrich to reopen the proceed-
ings for good cause shown for the entry 
of any stipulation or order, or for any 
other purpose required to obtain a final 
determination of the litigation. 
IF, within 60 days from the date herein 
[December 29, 1986], the Defendant B.F. 
Goodrich has not reopened the proceed-
ings for the purpose of obtaining a final 
determination herein, this action shall be 
deemed dismissed with prejudice.19 
Administrative Closing Order, Case No. 
CIV-86-1227-BT (W.D.Okla. December 29, 
1986). B.F. Goodrich did not move to re-
open the proceedings on its counterclaim 
within the sixty-day time period; thus the 
determined unanimously that oral argument 
would not materially assist the determination 
and ordered the cause submitted without oral 
argument. See Fed.&App.P. 34(a); 10th ClrJL 
34.1.8(c) and 27.1.2. The parties were afforded 
an opportunity for additional briefing before the 
en banc court. 
LEWIS v. B.F. 
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closing order by its own terms matured 
into a dismissal of the counterclaim with 
prejudice on February 27, 1987, creating an 
appealable final judgment for the entire 
case.2 
The fly in the ointment is that Lewis did 
not file a timely notice of appeal after the 
administrative closing order terminated the 
entire litigation. Then, after receiving no-
tice that we were considering dismissing 
the appeal, Lewis and defendants applied to 
the district court for certification of the 
December 18 order as final under Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 54(b). The district court granted the 
request on May 13, 1987, but again no one 
filed a notice of appeal after that certifica-
tion. 
If we follow the reasoning of A f t Smith 
Corp., 647 F.2d at 120-21, and other cases 
we have decided similarly, see, e.g., Lamp 
v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir.1981); 
Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus-
tries, Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir.1977), 
Lewis' premature notice of appeal was not 
cured by the later final judgment Fur-
ther, even if the Rule 54(b) certification, 
acquired after the district court judgment 
became final, was effective to resurrect the 
right to appeal the December 18 order, the 
failure to file a new notice of appeal there-
after would be fatal under Aft. Smith to 
any claim that the certification saved the 
appeal. 
Aft Smith stated that this court would 
dismiss appeals from interlocutory orders 
when the district court had not given Rule 
54(b) certification before the notice of ap-
peal was filed, even if the district court 
granted such certification subsequently 
and before this court entered a dismissal 
order. This rule was designed to benefit 
2. Although the district court's "administrative 
closing order" with respect to the counterclaim 
is somewhat peculiar, we construe it as not 
becoming a final judgment until the expiration 
of the sixty days given BJr. Goodrich to reopen 
its counterclaim. 
In Schuurman v. Motor Vessel "Betty K V, 
798 F.2d 442 (11th Cir.1986), the court faced an 
analogous situation: the district court dismissed 
plaintiffs complaint but granted plaintiff twenty 
days from the date of the order to amend the 
complaint. The Eleventh Circuit established the 
following rule for this situation: 
GOODRICH CO. 643 
641 (10th Cir. 1988) 
the appellate court, which no longer would 
have to hold the case in administrative lim-
bo while the appellant either returned to 
the district court to seek a Rule 54(b) certi-
fication or awaited the termination of the 
entire case. 
In A.O. Smith, the premature appeal 
was filed while the case was ongoing in 
the district court Thus, this court thought 
that the appellant could either await the 
end of the entire litigation in district court 
and then file a notice of appeal, or seek and 
obtain Rule 54(b) certification after which 
it could file a new notice of appeal. We 
thus formulated the rule in AO. Smith in 
anticipation that the rule would seldom re-
sult in a loss of appellate review for a 
disappointed litigant 'This is not a situa-
tion in which a procedural technicality for-
ever forecloses the appellant from having 
an appellate court consider the merits of 
the case." Id at 121. 
Apparently all of the other circuits that 
have considered this matter, however, have 
accepted jurisdiction in analogous circum-
stances, notwithstanding a premature fil-
ing of a notice of appeal. These circuits 
hold pre-Rule 54(b) appeals in abeyance 
while the parties obtain certification after 
the court's reminder of the omission, treat-
ing the 54(b) certification as relating nunc 
pro tunc to the date of the notice of appeal 
or treating the notice of appeal as ripening 
as of the date of the 54(b) certification. 
See Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 824 F.2d 84, 
85-87 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam); Coali-
tion for Equitable Minority Participation 
in Architectural Contracts in Tennessee 
(COMPACT) v. Metropolitan Government 
of Nashville and Davidson County, 786 
"If the plaintiff does not amend the complaint 
within the time allowed, no amendment may 
be made absent leave of court, and the dismis-
sal order becomes final at the end of the 
stated period. For appeal purposes, we hold 
that the order of dismissal in this situation 
becomes final upon the expiration of the time 
allowed for amendment The time for appeal 
is measured from the date on which the dis-
trict court order of dismissal becomes final." 
Id. at 445. 
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F.2d 227, 228 & n. 1 (6th Cir.1986); Lac 
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 
177, 180-81 (7th Cir.1985); Metallurgical 
Industries, Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 771 F.2d 
915, 916 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Free-
man v. Hittle, 747 F.2d 1299, 1301-02 (9th 
Cir.1984); Hayden v. McDonald, 719 F.2d 
266, 268 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (taking 
jurisdiction of appeal before determining 
that Rule 54(b) certification had been im-
providently granted); Tilden Financial 
Corp. v. Palo Tire Service, Inc., 596 F.2d 
604, 606-07 (3d Cir.1979). But cf. Oak 
Construction Co. v. Huron Cement Co., 
475 F.2d 1220, 1221 (6th Cir.1973) (per cu-
riam) (no 54(b) certification was entered 
before appellate court's decision; "[t]his 
lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured now by 
a belated Rule 54(b) certification"). 
The circuits that take a more forgiving 
attitude toward premature notices of ap-
peal state varying reasons to reject our 
A f t Smith approach. The Ninth Circuit, 
in Freeman v. Hittle, 747 F.2d 1299 (9th 
Cir.1984), takes direct issue with Af t 
Smith's assertion that dismissing prema-
ture notices of appeal would prevent ad-
ministrative complications: 
'The concern of the Tenth Circuit was 
that allowing appeals where the appel-
lant had not secured a 54(b) certification 
would lead to a large number of cases 
being held in a pending category and to 
confusion and delay. [Aft Smith, 647 
F.2d] at 121. We respectfully disagree. 
The procedure would not be unduly com-
plicated If a 54(b) certification had been 
entered since the notice of appeal, as 
here, the case would be properly before 
the reviewing court; if 54(b) certification 
had not been entered, the appeal would 
be dismissed as a nonfinal judgment" 
Id. at 1301-02. The Seventh Circuit takes 
the position that dismissal of premature 
notices of appeal actually would increase 
administrative burdens on courts and liti-
gants: "[D]ismissal of the appeal due to 
the belated certification would be 'empty 
paper shuffling1 because the same papers 
would likely be before the court in a matter 
of months after appellants went through 
'the empty formality of obtaining another 
certification and filing another notice of 
appeal.'" Lac Courte Oreilles Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wis-
consin, 760 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir.1985) 
(quoting Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Thomp-
son Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1074 (7th 
Cir.1981)). 
Strictly speaking, precedent in this cir-
cuit does not require dismissal of this ap-
peal The Af t Smith opinion did not cite 
or expressly overrule Morris v. Uhl & La-
pez Engineers, Inc., 442 F.2d 1247 (10th 
Cir.1971), in which we took a more charita-
ble approach to a premature notice of ap-
peal. The facts of Morris closely parallel 
the instant case. The appellant there filed 
a notice of appeal without obtaining Rule 
54(b) certification; the entire case was con-
cluded by the district court by the time the 
original appeal reached the panel's atten-
tion, but appellant had failed to file a new 
notice of appeal As in the instant case, a 
hard-line rule would have denied appellant 
any appeal at any time. Rejecting this 
approach, we wrote: 
"In our view, the notice of appeal had 
capacity in the circumstances to provide 
jurisdictional basis that would entitle this 
Court to refuse, as it did, to make dismis-
sal of the appeal out-of-hand and to allow 
the notice to ripen into full effectiveness 
as to the rendered judgment, since it 
seemed apparent that the judgment 
would remain unchanged in its form and 
content; that its lack of technical formal 
finality would become dispelled in natu-
ral course and within a not undue period 
of time; and that no prejudice could re-
sult to any one from so dealing: withthe^ 
notice." 
442 F.2d at 1250. See also Frankfort Oil 
Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 438-39 (10th 
Cir.) (allowing appeal in similar circum-
stances), cert denied, 364 U.S. 920, 81 
S.Ct 283, 5 LEA2d 59 (1960). 
Morris and A f t Smith are not irrecon-
cilable. In Morris, the appeal would have 
been lost but for the court's lenity. AO. 
Smith, in contrast, did not present an ap-
pellant which would lose entirely its right 
to appeal if the panel ruled against it 
LEWIS v. B.F. 
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Thus, perhaps the two cases can coexist in 
this circuit on this basis; but there is no 
doubt great tension exists between their 
different approaches. 
Jurisdictional problems under the A.O. 
Smith rationale have arisen too frequently 
in this circuit since that decision. In a 
typical scenario, counsel, after belatedly 
recognizing the lack of a Rule 54(b) certifi-
cation, would secure such a certification 
from the district court but would fail to file 
a new notice of appeal. Because the ap-
pealed order was final and certified for 
appeal under Rule 54(b), failure to file a 
new notice foreclosed the appeal unless the 
court was willing to interpret the words 
"final order" in Rule 54(b) and in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 as having different meanings. See 
Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 835 
F.2d 245, 247 n. 2 (10th Cir.1987). In other 
cases no Rule 54(b) certification would ever 
be obtained, but before this court alerted 
the parties to the jurisdictional defect, the 
district court would have terminated the 
entire litigation by adjudicating the other 
claims. The losing parties, thinking they 
already had a viable appeal raising the 
issues that concerned them, would fail to 
file a new notice of appeal. Thus, the 
requirement that a new notice of appeal be 
filed after a belated Rule 54(b) certification 
or after disposition of all other claims often 
proved a trap for unwary attorneys. Fur-
ther, the rule of A.O. Smith caused this 
court to expend undue judicial resources 
untangling situations such as the "adminis-
trative closing order" in the case before us. 
Because of these problems we now over-
rule A.O. Smith, Lamp, Golden Villa Spa, 
and any other cases to the same effect, and 
we reaffirm Morris, with the refinements 
hereafter noted 
In the situation like that before us, in 
which the other claims were effectively dis-
missed after the notice of appeal was filed, 
we believe Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(2) permits the 
interpretation that the notice of appeal, 
filed prematurely, ripens and saves the ap-
peal. Accord Cape May Greene, Inc. v. 
Warren, 698 F.2d 179,184-85 (3d Cir.1983); 
see also Finn v. Prudential-Bache Securi-
ties, Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 585 (11th Cir.1987) 
(allowing appeal without express reliance 
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upon Fed.R.App.P. 4(aX2)); Gillis v. Unit-
ed States Department of Health & Hu-
man Services, 759 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 
1985) (same); Pireno v. New York State 
Chiropractic Association, 650 F.2d 387, 
389-90 n. 4 (2d Cir.1981) (same), affd sub 
nom. Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. 
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 102 S.Ct 3002, 73 
L.Ed.2d 647 (1982); Anderson v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (same); Jetco Electronic Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 
(5th Cir. 1973) (same). In analogous situa-
tions, the Supreme Court has allowed sub-
sequent events to validate prematurely 
filed appeals. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct 227, 229-30, 
9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Lemke v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 325, 326, 74 S.Ct 1, 1, 98 
L.Ed. 3 (1953) (criminal appeal). Thus, 
when a district court has adjudicated all 
remaining outstanding claims before this 
appellate court acts to dismiss the appeal, 
we will consider the appeal on its merits 
rather than dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
whether or not a party in the meantime has 
obtained a Rule 54(b) certification. In such 
cases generally we will consolidate or com-
panion the earlier appeal with any subse-
quent appeals arising out of the same dis-
trict court case. 
When the district court case is still ongo-
ing at the time the appeal reaches this 
court's attention, two possibilities arise. 
One is that a belated Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion has been obtained. In this situation, if 
the appellant obtains a 54(b) certification 
after the notice of appeal was filed, we will 
deem the notice of appeal to ripen as of the 
date of certification and will accept the 
jurisdiction pursuant to the savings provi-
sion of Fed.RApp.P. 4(a)(2). The other 
possibility is that no Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) cer-
tification has been obtained. For this, we 
hereby adopt the practice of notifying the 
parties of our observation of the apparent 
jurisdictional defect and giving them a date 
certain by which to secure Rule 54(b) certi-
fication or an order or judgment explicitly 
adjudicating all remaining claims. If no 
certification, or final, dispositive adjudica-
tion, is obtained and presented to this ap-
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pellate court by the specified date, the case 
will be dismissed summarily for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Having determined that we have jurisdic-
tion in the instant case, we order the appeal 
placed on the regular calendar. Briefs are 
to be filed according to the schedule set out 
in 10th Cir.R. 31 measured from the date 
this opinion is entered. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, with 
whom BRORBY, Circuit Judge, joins, 
dissenting. 
The majority holds that a premature no-
tice of appeal is effective if a subsequent 
Fe&R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification is obtained 
or if a final adjudication of the matter 
occurs before the court considers the mer-
its of the appeal. I respectfully disagree 
with this procedure for two reasons. First, 
I do not think that the court of appeals has 
the power to expand appellate jurisdiction 
through reinterpretation of settled law. 
Second, even assuming the new procedure 
is more efficient, I question the need to 
provide a failsafe system for preserving a 
civil appeal due to the ease of compliance 
with the established rules. 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that "The 
courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction 
of appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States . . . 
except where a direct review may be had in 
the Supreme Court" In the situation be-
fore us, there is little mystery as to what 
constitutes a final decision. A final deci-
sion under § 1291 is one which " 'ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
for the court to do but execute on the 
judgment'" Gulfstream Aerospace 
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., — U.S. , 
108 S.Ct 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) 
1. FedJLCivJ\ 54 provides: 
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or In-
volving Multiple Parties. When more than 
one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of 
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than ail of the claims or the parties only upon 
an express determination that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express di-
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 
229, 233, 65 S.Ct 631, 633, 89 L.EA 911 
(1945)). In the absence of a final judgment 
on all claims or a final judgment on part of 
the claims, Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) makes it 
clear that 1) there can be no final decision 
which terminates the action, and 2) any 
previous decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of a final judg-
ment adjudicating all claims.1 Although 
the collateral-order doctrine provides an ex-
ception to the final-decision rule contained 
in § 1291, the doctrine is without applica-
tion in this case. See Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 
69 S.Ct 1221,1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) 
(collateral-order doctrine stated); Coopers 
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 
98 S.Ct 2454, 2457, 57 LEd.2d 351 (1978) 
(requirements for application of collateral-
order doctrine). Instead, we are presented 
with a notice of appeal filed before the 
district court adjudicated all the claims in 
the action and before a Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion was obtained. 
Under our prior decisions, this appeal 
would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Appellate jurisdiction would be determined 
as of the date the notice of appeal was filed 
(January 16, 1987), and a later Rule 54(b) 
certification by the district court would be 
ineffective. Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 
1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1981); A.O. Smith 
Corp. v. Sims ConsoL, Ltd., 647 P.2d 118, 
120 (10th Cir.1981). Although summary 
judgment in favor of defendants was en-
tered on the main claim on December 18, 
1986, that judgment failed to adjudicate all 
the claims of the parties. It was not a finaL 
judgment Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The next-
order entered on December 31, 1987, the 
administrative closing order staying the de-
rection for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all 
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of the parties. 
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fendant's counterclaim, left defendant 
Goodrich the option of reopening the action 
within sixty days. The administrative clos-
ing order indicates that the district court 
never intended its summary judgment or-
der to be a final order. The counterclaim 
was pending at the time the notice of ap-
peal was filed, January 16, 1987, and the 
summary judgment entered by the district 
court could have been revised. Golden 
Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549 
F.2d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir.1977); Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 54(b). Accordingly, the notice of 
appeal was premature and ineffective. 
The majority concludes that the prema-
ture notice of appeal became effective 
when the administrative closing order "ma-
tured into a dismissal of the counterclaim 
with prejudice" and thereby created an ap-
pealable final judgment Majority Opinion 
at 643. The majority claims to find support 
for its new rule in FecLR.App.P. 4(aX2), 
which provides: 
Except as provided in (aX4) of this 
Rule 4, a notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision or order but 
before entry of the judgment or order 
shall be treated as filed after such entry 
and on the day thereof. 
Fed.R.App.P. 4(aX4), referred to in Rule 
4(aX2), clarifies that a notice of appeal filed 
prior to the disposition of a post-trial mo-
tion is ineffective and that a new notice of 
appeal must be filed after the disposition of 
the motion. By its terms, Rule 4(aX2) ap-
plies when a party appeals "after the an-
nouncement of a decision or order but be-
fore entry oi the judgment or order/' "It 
applies, therefore, only to a decision that 
will be final on its entry. It does not make 
appealable an order that is not appealable 
under § 1291 or § 1292(a)." 9 J. Moore, B. 
Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 
11204.14 (1987). Thus, Rule 4(aX2) hardly 
applies in these circumstances because the 
original summary judgment was not an 
appealable order. Moreover, the appellate 
rules are not to be construed so as to 
expand the court's jurisdiction. FedJt. 
App.P. 1(b). 
2. See also Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 V2& 
6T7t 681 (9th Cir.1980) ("Analogously, subse-
quent events can validate a prematurely filed 
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The majority also relies on other cases 
which have reached a similar result The 
most persuasive reason advanced for this 
result is that the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that there must be a practical rather 
than technical approach to finality under 
§ 1291, one which balances the harms of 
piecemeal review against justice denied by 
delay. Gillespie v. United States Steel 
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct 308, 311, 
13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 
546, 69 S.Ct at 1225. I cannot agree, 
however, that "[f]n analagous situations, 
the Supreme Court has allowed subsequent 
events to validate prematurely filed ap-
peals. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 
178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct 227, 229-30, 9 L.Ed.2d 
222 (1962); Lemke v. United States, 346 
U.S. 325, 326, 74 S.Ct 1, 98 L.Ed. 3 (1953) 
(criminal appeal)." Majority Opinion at 
645.2 These brief cases simply do not turn 
on an attempt to appeal solely from a judg-
ment which could not be final upon entry. 
Because I view the majority's decision as 
conflicting with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), I am 
not persuaded that the general Supreme 
Court authority mentioned by the majority 
is adequate support for the result achieved 
here. 
There is another reason why I cannot 
agree with the new procedure announced 
by the majority. Perfecting an appeal is 
not a difficult task and it should be entrust-
ed to those appearing before the court 
rather than to the court itself. The follow-
ing best expresses this sentiment 
The rules of appellate practice in hand 
are simple and plain. They fill no office 
of mere red tape, or as a show of surface 
routine. To the contrary, they have sub-
stance, and carry on their face the obvi-
ous purpose to aid appellate courts in 
getting at the right of a cause. Hence, 
apparently, they bespeak the dignity aris-
ing from obedience. If they are not to 
be obeyed, they should be done away 
with once and for all. A just rule, fairly 
interpreted and enforced, wrongs no 
man. Ostensibly enforced, but not, it 
appeal."). This proposition is also supported by 
citations to Foman and Lemke. 
648 850 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
necessarily wrongs some men viz., those 
who labor to obey it—the very ones it 
should not injure. 
Sullivan v. Holbrook, 109 S.W. 668, 670 
(Mo. 1908) (Lamm, J.). After our initial re-
minder that the appeal was jurisdictionally 
defective, appellants obtained a Rule 54(b) 
certification from the district court but did 
not file another notice of appeal. In light of 
what was settled Tenth Circuit law at the 
time, the failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal was hardly prudent In the long 
run, and in fairness to those who do follow 
the simple appellate rules, the court's time 
is better spent resolving correctly filed ap-
peals rather than shepherding stray appeals 
back into the flock. 
I would dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellee* 
v. 
STEVEN W. (a Juvenile), 
Defendant-Appellant* 
No. 87-1781. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
July 5, 1988. 
Juvenfle was adjudged delinquent by 
the United States District Court for the 
District of New Mexico, Juan G. Burciaga, 
J., and juvenile appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Tacha, Circuit Judge, held that 
date of order formally adjudicating juvenile 
as delinquent, not date on which juvenile 
was arraigned by magistrate and agreed to 
admit to violation, triggered 20-day time 
clock of statute requiring disposition hear-
ing within 20 days of juvenile delinquency 
hearing. 
Affirmed. 
Infants <*=>204 
Date of district court's order which 
formally adjudged juvenile delinquent, not 
date on which juvenile was arraigned by 
magistrate and agreed to admit to viola-
tion, triggered 20-day time clock of statute 
requiring disposition hearing within 20 
days after juvenile delinquency hearing; 
20-day rule was not violated because sen-
tencing occurred on same date as adjudica-
tion of delinquency. 18 UJ3.CA. § 5037. 
Ann Steinmetz, Asst Federal Public De-
fender, Albuquerque, N.M., for defendant-
appellant 
Mark Jarmie, Asst U.S. Atty., (William 
L. Lutz, U.S. Atty., and David N. Williams, 
Asst U.S. Atty., with him on the brief), 
Albuquerque, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before McKAY, BARRETT and 
TACHA, Circuit Judges. 
TACHA, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Steven W. (a juvenile) was 
charged on February 13, 1987, with violat-
ing the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037, by committing the 
offense of assault with a dangerous weap-
on with intent to do bodily harm. He was 
arraigned on March 20,1987, before a Unit-
ed States Magistrate and agreed to admit 
to the violation. On May 15, 1987, the 
defendant appeared before the United 
States District Court which found him to be 
a juvenile delinquent and placed him on 
probation for six months. 
The afternoon before his hearing in the 
district court, the defendant asked the 
court to dismiss the charge against him 
because of an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 5037. The court denied the motion, and 
defendant appeals. 
The relevant portion of section 5037 in 
effect at the time, provided: 
If the court finds a juvenile to be a 
juvenile delinquent, the court shall hold a 
disposition hearing concerning the appro* 
priate disposition no later than twenty 
